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Executive summary 
Innovation is a crucial driver of national and regional success. Innovation activities are 
often associated with increased growth and higher average wages. However, few 
studies have considered the potential consequences of innovation: are the gains from 
innovation shared equally in the society? What is their overall effect of innovation 
activities on income inequality?  
This report provides empirical evidence on the relationship between innovation and 
income inequality on the regional/subnational level. Our data set includes 126 EU 
spatial entities over a long time period. It focuses on two interrelated issues on the 
innovation-inequality link: (i) the effects of innovation on the overall income 
distribution; (ii) the influence of innovation on different income groups, such as high, 
middle and low ones.  
Estimated results present evidence of the nexus, since our empirics portray that 
innovation have significant and diverse effects in different income inequality indicators, 
as it reduces overall distribution and the gap between high incomes and lower and 
middle income groups, while enhancing at the same time high incomes. Overall, we can 
infer that technological process and high tech investment, in the form of innovative 
actions, does not hamper the inclusive growth of an economy. 
 4 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Policymakers have placed great emphasis on innovation as the key in forming 
successful national and regional economies. In the European Union, this has been 
formulated through the Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 strategy, which aims to 
generate a dynamic, smart, innovative and sustainable European economy through the 
increase of innovation1. Specifically, European Commission’s Innovation Union initiative 
states that by improving conditions and access to finance for research and innovation 
in Europe, we can ensure that innovative ideas can be turned into products and services 
that create growth and jobs (see COM(2014) 339 final).  
Relevant theory and empirical evidence argues that innovative countries and regions 
tend to grow faster and have higher average wages (Lee and Rodrıguez-Pose, 2013).  
However, few studies have considered the potential consequences of innovation on 
income inequality: are the gains from innovation shared equally in the society? What is 
their overall effect on income inequality? 
This study aims to shed light on the innovation-inequality relationship in the EU. By 
constructing relevant inequality indicators and utilising patent data for the 2002-2014 
period, the association between innovation activities and an array of inequality 
indicators will be empirically assessed. Innovativeness will be measured using patent 
flows in the corresponding EU spatial units. Effort will be placed on the examination of 
both, overall and high income inequality indicators, to draw relevant conclusions. For 
example, when we look at patenting2 and the income distribution in the EU-28 – 
represented by the Gini index – we see that these two variables tend to synchronously 
progress (see Figure 1, below). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
1 See decisions of the European Council on 17 June 2010 (EUCO 13/10). 
2 Patents reflect a country's inventive activity. Patents also show the country's capacity to exploit 
knowledge and translate it into potential economic gains. In this context, indicators based on 
patent statistics are widely used to assess the inventive performance of countries. See Eurostat 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Patent_statistics_background (accessed 
26/02/2018) 
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Figure 1: Gini index of inequality and Patenting in EU-28, 2006-2013 
 
Sources: see Benczúr, Cseres-Gergely & Harasztosi (2017) for GINI and Eurostat for patenting. 
              Gini index refers to the overall income distribution of the EU-28. 
 
However, a further examination of specific inequality characteristics of the EU provides 
additional motivation for our investigations. Specifically, the linear fit of the patent 
applications and the Gini index for EU regions reveals that more patenting activity is 
correlated with lower inequality (see Figure 2, below). At the same time, top incomes 
increase (see Figure 3, below). These pieces of evidence further motivate our research 
question.  
Figure 2: Gini index and Patenting, Sub-national 
EU panel, 2004-2014 
Figure 3: Top 10% income share and Patenting, 
Sub-national EU panel, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; EU-SILC, BHPS & GSOEP for 
income inequality calculations and Eurostat for patenting. 
Source: Authors’ calculations; EU-SILC, BHPS & GSOEP for 
income inequality calculation and Eurostat for patenting. 
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Relevant descriptive statistics on a more detailed level picture the disparities available 
among the EU-28 regions. The range of inequality across regions in Europe is generally 
large, and so is the range of patenting activity. For example, in the Brussels region 
(Belgium) the richest 10% receive more than 33.3% of total income in 2014, while 
ranked in the middle of the regions in terms of innovativeness effort (135.9 patents per 
million of active population). On the contrary, the region of Lansi-Suomi (Finland) for 
the same year pictures rather low levels of income inequality indicators (21.7% and 
0.24 for the top 10% and Gini, respectively), while offering above average levels of 
patenting activity (404.2 per million of active population). Finally, a number of regions 
present low patenting activity combined with relatively augmented top income and 
overall inequality levels. For example, the region of Castilla and Leon (Spain) has low 
levels of patenting activity (50.6 per million of active population in 2012), while overall 
inequality measured by Gini is at 0.30 and the richest 10% receives almost 24% of the 
total income share.  
The above variations between innovation activities and inequality patterns are also 
evident from the respective maps of the EU sub-national regions. Figure 4 depicts the 
Gini coefficient in 2008, where higher inequality can be observed in the Southern and 
Eastern periphery of Europe; lower levels are evident in North and Western ones. With 
respect to patents in Figure 5 we see core innovative activities taking place mainly in 
the most industrialised areas (i.e., Germany, Northern Italy, the Benelux countries, the 
south-eastern UK and Scandinavia). 
This study presents a comprehensive comparative assessment of the link between 
innovation and inequality in a wide European context (EU-28), investigating several 
measures of inequality, such as the overall income distribution, the top income shares 
and related income ratios, for a long time period (2004-2014). It uses a unique dataset 
originating from different European and national micro surveys, EU-SILC, the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), and the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). These 
are used to create measures of inequality, which together with matched Eurostat spatial 
entities are used to investigate the link between innovation and inequality. Previous 
studies were mainly contacted using sub-samples of the EU-28 regions and for 
restricted portions of the income distribution (see Lee, 2011; Lee and Rodríguez-Pose, 
2013)  
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Figure 4: Gini index of inequality, 2008 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC, BHPS & GSOEP  
 
 
Figure 5: Patents per mil. inhabitants, 2008 
 
Source: Eurostat  
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Results obtained reveal a comprehensive picture with regards to the effects of 
innovation on income inequality. First, innovative activities have a negative effect on 
the overall income distribution as expressed by the Gini coefficient. In other words, 
innovativeness appears to reduce overall inequality in the EU and thus, offers relative 
gains to society. Second, such innovative activities appear to enhance the income share 
of the higher income groups, as patenting is found to be significantly and positively 
associated with top income (i.e. Top 1% and Top 10%).  
The rest of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical and 
empirical literature review on the innovation-inequality relation. Section 3 presents the 
data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the results, while Section 5 
concludes. 
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2. Literature review on the link between innovation and inequality 
 
The aim of this section is to have a better understanding of the current state of 
knowledge on the innovation-inequality link. Innovation is a key factor in the production 
process and hence of wealth creation. It fosters economic growth, brings together new 
products and production techniques. But is innovation a factor that influences income 
inequality? Are the benefits of innovation distributed in the society in an equitable way? 
The present section reviews theoretical as well as empirical studies which have 
considered the mechanisms underlying the link between innovation and inequality.  
In order to investigate the link between innovation and inequality, the econometric 
models developed mostly consider measures of inequality as the dependent variable 
and measures of innovation as the explanatory variables. The Gini coefficient, the Theil 
index or ratios between percentiles are usually the inequality measures deployed in 
these models. Patenting is the most frequent variable as a proxy for innovation. It is 
an output of innovation, and that is why it is considered a better measure than an input 
of innovation such as R&D expenditure. Obviously, most econometric models do not 
control only for innovation. Different potential explanatory covariates determining 
income inequality are, therefore, included. Typically, these variables reflect 
sociodemographic, economic and institutional characteristics. Examples are GDP per 
capita, population density, education, etc. Overall, despite a variety of empirical 
approaches, a large number of the articles find a positive and significant relationship, 
concluding that innovation has an effect on inequality. 
2.1 Theoretical foundations 
This section briefly illustrates the main theoretical explanations of the nexus between 
the income inequality and innovation. Below we discuss the main arguments put 
forward by the related literature to support the aforementioned nexus. 
As argued by Lee (2011) and Liu and Lawell (2015), the theoretical literature on 
innovation and inequality has mainly focused on the mechanisms through which 
innovation can impact on income inequality due to its relevant effects on skill premia . 
The mechanisms include:  
• Higher skilled workers tend to earn higher returns in more innovative regions; 
• Knowledge spill overs: less skilled workers can learn from more skilled ones, thus 
increasing their productivity; 
• Spatial agglomeration effects of innovation  
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• Technological change can produce changes in the employment shares and wages 
for different skill groups (skill-biased technical changing and task-based 
framework) 
The following arguments belong to theories which are related directly to the production 
function: 
• Skill Bias Technological Change (SBTC) is the dominant mechanism by which the 
literature explains the connection between innovation and wage inequality. 
According to this approach, higher educated individuals are those who are more 
capable to use new technology and, for this reason, will receive higher wages. On 
the contrary, unskilled individuals will receive lower wages.  
• An explanation for earnings inequality between groups stems from the variability 
of the demand for skills, which in turn depends on innovation. Innovation brings 
new products and new processes, leading to changes in the demand of skill, as the 
ones that were in excessive demand before the innovation are now in excess 
supply. (Svizzero and Tisdell, 2003). Inequality within groups can be explained by 
differences in workers’ ability to adapt to new technology (Aghion et al., 2000). 
• The so-called “task-based framework” focus on the distinction between routine and 
non-routine tasks. Non-routine tasks include complex tasks and manual task which 
cannot be substituted by information and communication technologies. This implies 
that technological change rewards workers not in terms of their ability to use new 
technologies but with respect of their capacity not to be replaced by them 
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). 
Other theories are more related to the industrial organization and the political economy 
field: 
• The Risk-Reward Nexus (RRN) framework is an approach according to which certain 
economic actors - through their power to strategically position themselves along 
the innovation process - get rewards disproportionately high with respect to the 
risk borne by them. The RRN approach thus, provides an explanation to the 
concentration of income among the top 1% and even top 0.1%, contrary to the 
Skill Bias Technological Change (SBTC) approach, which focuses on the impact of 
technological change on skilled and unskilled workers (Lazonick & Mazzucato, 
2013). 
• When technological change is slow, it fosters barriers to entry. In contrast, when 
technological change is fast, it can reduce income inequality via reduction of 
monopolistic rents. In addition, given that a large portion of top incomes is based 
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on rents of incumbents, high rate of technological change reduces top income levels 
(Antonelli & Gehringer, 2017). 
• The Schumpeterian growth model predicts that innovation by both incumbent and 
entrants, increases top income shares, which reflects innovation rents. In addition, 
it predicts that innovation by entrants increases social mobility, which in turn 
results from creative destruction and associated firm and job turnover (Aghion et 
al., 2015). 
Finally, a number of theories emphasize the urban/regional economic aspect: 
• Innovation tends to cluster within large cities, producing externalities which cannot 
benefit firm and workers located in smaller and remote areas (Echeverri-Carroll & 
Ayala, 2009, Breau et al., 2014). This has an impact on the wage structure of such 
firms located in cities, through competition. Specifically, industries which are more 
innovative tend to pay higher wage so as to reward workers who acquired the 
necessary capabilities to command new technologies. 
 
2.2 Empirical studies 
The following part discusses the econometric methods used in the empirical studies and 
their main findings. In addition, this review is tabulated in Table 1B (available in 
Appendix B), which contains the details and the main results of each study.  
In short, the empirical studies presented test the hypothesis whether innovation has 
an effect on income inequality. These works may be grouped into two main categories: 
• Studies focusing on the concentration of income on the top of the distribution; 
• Regional/local level studies. 
Donegan and Lowe (2008), using a simple ordinary least square model for metropolitan 
statistical areas in United States, show a positive association between innovation and 
wage inequality. The latter, which is the dependent variable of the model, is measured 
by an inequality index computed as the ratio between the average income of the 
creative class and of the non-creative classes. For innovation, the Milken Institute’s 
Tech-Pole Index is adopted as a proxy for the skill-bias technical innovation. This index 
is a composite measure of local high-tech industrial output. The results suggest that 
inequality is higher in creative cities and that innovation positively contributes to 
inequality of wages in them.  
Starting from the study conducted by Florida (2005) that suggest that the most US 
innovative areas are also the most unequal, Lee (2011) contributes to the literature by 
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investigating for the first time if the same also applies in Europe. Specifically, the study 
examines and tests the link between innovation and inequality for a panel of European 
Regions (89 regions) over the 1996–2001 period, using the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) and the Eurostat Regio database. Here, two measures of 
innovation are considered: the number of patents per 100,000 inhabitants and its sub-
categories (high-tech, biotech and ICT patenting), and the proportion of employment 
in knowledge-based industries. In order to deal with the instability at the top and at 
the bottom of the income distribution, the author takes into consideration five measure 
of inequality: Gini coefficient, Theil index, two Atkinson indexes (two different values 
of the inequality aversion parameter) and the ratio of the 80th and 20th percentiles of 
the distribution. The results strongly indicate a positive link between innovation as 
measured by patenting and inequality. The evidence is weaker when the considered 
measure of innovation is the proportion of employment in knowledge-based industries.  
Lee and Rodríguez-Pose (2013) provide the first empirical evidence on the link under 
consideration in a comparative perspective, studying both US cities and European 
regions. To construct measures of inequality, they use microdata from ECHP and the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) for European Regions and US cities, respectively. 
Again, innovation is measured by patenting, and specifically patent applications to the 
European Patent Office (EPO) per million inhabitants. Alongside this, more specific 
measures of innovation are used like the high-tech, biotech and ICT patent applications. 
Confirming the results of Lee (2011), the study presents strong evidence of a positive 
link between innovation and inequality for European Regions, but only a limited one for 
the US. According to the authors, the more flexible labor markets and the higher level 
of migration might explain the weaker association between innovation and inequality in 
US.  
Among the papers which study the link with regard to European regions, Castells et al. 
(2015) develop an empirical analysis in order to understand which factors guide the 
recent increase in income inequality, with special focus on pre- and post- Great 
Recession. While innovation is not directly explored by the authors, the number of 
persons with tertiary education and /or employed in science and technology (as a 
measure of the technological change) serves as a control variable for explaining 
inequality. Its coefficient, when significant, is positive. What distinguishes this study 
from others is the use of two different surveys: ECHP for the period 1996–2001 and 
the European Union Survey on Income and Living Standard (EU-SILC) starting from 
2004 to 2011.  
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Regarding advanced industrial economies, Breau et al. (2014) inspect the relationship 
between innovation and inequality for Canadian cities in order to understand whether 
innovation has played a role for the recently observed changes in the wages 
distribution. The measure of innovation is built using the patent applications filed and 
granted to Canadian residents. The Gini coefficient and Theil index are the measures of 
inequality adopted. Their main findings are in the same direction as other studies, 
showing that cities which are more innovative are also more unequal. 
Following the econometric model proposed by Lee and Rodríguez-Pose (2013), Liu and 
Lawell (2015) recently explored the impact of innovation on income inequality in China. 
Unlike the other studies, the measure of inequality proposed is the ratio between urban 
and rural income in order to reflect the large gap between urban and rural income in 
China. Using province-level data over the 1995–2011 period, the authors show a 
nonlinear relationship between innovation and inequality. In particular, they find an 
inequality reducing effect for small (patent) volumes of innovation, while the opposite 
applies for larger ones. 
The direct link between the growth of the top income share and the rate and quality of 
innovation is investigated by Aghion et al. (2015). Using a US state-level sample (1975-
2010), the authors conclude that innovation (proxied by patenting flow) plays a role in 
explaining the evolution of the top 1% income share. The study develops a 
Schumpeterian growth model which, among others, provides evidence that innovation 
increases top income shares. In order to investigate the link between innovation and 
top income inequality, the paper uses a cross-state panel.  In addition, patents citation 
data complement the measurement of patented innovation. OLS regressions of top 
income share on different measure of innovation result in positive and significant 
estimates. The same regression has been performed by the authors using broader 
measures of inequality, for instance the Gini coefficient, the Theil index, the Atkinson 
index, and the top 10% income share. In contrast to the previous results, results 
offered for these measures show that innovation seems to be a weaker predictor of 
inequality. 
Different from the main findings reviewed so far, Antonelli and Gehringer (2017) find a 
negative relationship between inequality (Gini, quantile ratios) and technological 
change (number of patent applications). The paper argues that income inequality is the 
consequence of the declining pace of technological change. To test this hypothesis, they 
use a quintile regression for a panel of 39 developed countries over the period 1995 – 
2011. According to their finding, the rate of technological change reduces inequality. 
Moreover, the inequality reducing effect of technological change is nonlinear, meaning 
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that this effect is stronger, the higher the income inequality is. According to the authors, 
this result is indicative of the relationship between the rate of technological change and 
the rent component of disposable income, implying that top incomes are the most 
affected by the introduction of new technologies.  
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3. Econometric modelling and data 
 
3.1. The model 
The following econometric specification will be estimated: 
log() = 	 +	 +	 	+	 log( ()) +  +  	               (1) 
where ,	denotes a measure of inequality, B is a territorial fixed effect and B a year 
fixed effect,	innov() is innovativeness in year t-1 and X a vector of control variables. 
The inclusion of country and fixed effects eliminate permanent spatial differences in 
inequality, as well as aggregate changes in inequality. Autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are applied using the Newey-West variance 
estimator in all our regressions. Note that the choice of the one year lagged innovation 
variable better captures the effect of innovativeness on inequality, following also the 
relevant literature (see Aghion et al., 2015).4  
Fixed effects and Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimators are utilised. The 
Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic panel estimator used is an 
estimator   designed for situations with 1) few time periods and many individuals (“small 
T, large N” panels), 2) a linear functional relationship; 3) a single left-hand-side variable 
that is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; 4) independent variables that 
are not strictly exogenous, meaning correlated with past and possibly current 
realizations of the error; 5) fixed individual effects;  and  6)  heteroscedasticity  and  
autocorrelation  within  individuals  but  not  across  them (Roodman, 2006). So, 
according to the characteristics of the latter estimator, endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity inconsistencies are treated, and thus will not affect our results (see 
Arellano and Bond, 1991; Caselli et al., 1996). The model we estimate is:  
 
log() = 	 +	 +	 	+   !(()) +   !( ()) + 	 log( ) + " + 	   (2) 
 
Model (2) therefore differs from model (1) by the inclusion of the terms   !(()) 
and  log( ) which is the baseline version of the dynamic GMM.  
                                           
4 According to Aghion et al. (2015) patent applications are often organized and supervised by 
firms who start paying for the financing and management of the innovation right after (or even 
before) the application date as they anticipate the future profits from the patent. Also, firms may 
sell a product embedding an innovation before the patent has been granted, thereby already 
appropriating some of the profits from the innovation. 
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3.2 Data 
For calculating the inequality measures on the regional level, we use household micro-
data. Then, the measures are aggregated in order to match the region-year panel 
deployed in the regressions. 
As a first step, we merge household level micro-data from EU-SILC, the BHPS and the 
GSOEP. The income variable we take as the base for our computations is the equivalised 
disposable household income. In order to remove the effect of inflation, we transpose 
income into real terms using the Eurostat-issued annual Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) with 2015 as the base year. Finally, we compute Gini indices, income 
shares, and decile ratios for each spatial entity. 
Overall, the micro data consists of 2,265,219 household-level observations ranging 
from years 2004 to 2014l; the number of territorial units is 126. Due to the inconsistent 
reporting of NUTS levels across countries and years in the micro-surveys, the territorial 
units are a mixture of NUTS0, NUTS1, and NUTS2 regions. Overall, our data set includes 
126 spatial entities consisting of 12 NUTS0, 61 NUTS1 and 53 NUTS2 regions. 5 
The measure of innovation used in this study is patenting, and in particular in two 
notions: the number of patent applications per million of inhabitants and per million of 
active population.6  We believe that the later better captures the innovation effort of 
the different spatial entities, by controlling for employed population. Several sub-
indicators are also used, namely high-tech, micro-organism and genetic engineering as 
well as ICT patenting. As Lee and Rodriguez-Pose (2013) argue, the key strength of 
using patenting as a proxy for innovation lies in the nature of patents indicating output 
rather than input. Hence, it is a better measure of innovation in contrast to R&D 
spending or the value of high-technology sectors. However, this measure ignores non 
patented innovation (such as process innovation); another issue is that it does not 
account for the success of the innovation, or the extent to which it is successfully 
commercialized. 
A set of independent variables are employed to account for other potential determinants 
of inequality. Following Galor and Moav (2004), the effect of physical and human capital 
accumulation is introduced. In short, the “unified” theory of Galor and Moav (2004) 
proposes the endogenous replacement of physical capital by human capital as the prime 
engine of economic growth. In our study, the natural logarithm of the ratio between 
                                           
5 The availability of spatial entities per country is presented in Table 3A in Appendix A. It is a 
well-known limitation of EU SILC that no consistent reporting of NUTS levels across all countries 
is available.    
6 Data definitions and sources are available in Table 1A in Appendix A.  
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physical and human capital (% of the labour force with tertiary education) is used. In 
addition, the size of the government is employed, using the value added of the public 
sector. Finally, population density is calculated for each spatial entity using the 
respective population and the land area in square kilometres.7 
  
                                           
7 Descriptive statistics are available in Table 2A. 
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4. Econometric analysis  
 
 
 
 
In this section we empirically examine the relationship between innovativeness and 
income inequality, using a sample of EU-28 sub-national entities. As presented earlier 
in the literature review, relevant theoretical and empirical evidence are rather mixed; 
there are grounds for assuming both beneficial and detrimental effects depending on 
the inequality indicator utilised, for example overall distribution, top income or related 
inequality ratios. Furthermore, patenting activity, although regularly utilised throughout 
the literature, is considered a proxy of innovation rather than a definite direct measure 
(Wilkof, 2014). 
In order to tackle the above concerns, two patenting variables are used, namely patent 
applications per million of inhabitants and patent applications as percent of active 
population. The latter captures the innovation effort of the utilised workforce, rather 
than of the whole population, as the former does. In addition, three types of innovation 
indicators are employed: the Gini coefficient to capture overall distribution effects, top 
1% and top 10% income shares in order to estimate developments in the high end of 
the distribution and, finally, the ratio of incomes at the 90th and the 10th percentile 
(Ratio 90/10) as well as the Ratio 90/50 to access effects originating from the imparities 
between the high, the middle and the low income groups, respectively.  
In order to empirically examine the effects of innovation activities on income inequality 
we proceed following a step-wise manner strategy. Specifically:  
• at the first stage, estimations on the effect of innovation on inequality are 
provided, using a number of related control variables offered by literature;9  
• at the second stage, a thorough investigation of the innovation activities is 
performed by including different categories of patents, such as high-tech, micro-
organism and ICT patents. 
• Finally, the robustness of our empirics is further investigated by focusing on a 
spatial sample of NUTS 2 regions and the addition of time effects.   
4.1. Baseline estimations 
All estimation tables are contained in the appendix. In Tables 1 and 2, we report results 
from a panel regression where fixed effect and the Generalized Method of Moment 
(GMM) estimator are utilised. The Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) 
                                           
9 Please refer to Table 1A in the Appendix for a complete list of the definitions and the sources of 
the variables used throughout.  
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dynamic panel estimator used is an estimator designed for situations with 1) few time 
periods and many individuals (“small T, large N” panels), 2) a linear functional 
relationship; 3) a single left-hand-side variable that is dynamic, depending on its own 
past realizations; 4) independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning 
correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error; 5) fixed individual 
effects;  and  6)  heteroscedasticity  and  autocorrelation  within  individuals  but  not  
across  them (Roodman, 2006). So, according to the characteristics of the latter 
estimator, endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity inconsistencies are treated, and 
thus will not affect our results (see Arellano and Bond, 1991; Caselli et al., 1996). 
Preliminary empirical results present evidence on the innovation-inequality link, as the 
explanatory variables portray mainly a statistically significant effect on the dependent 
variable. Specifically, our model includes the effects of patenting on income inequality, 
with the inclusion of different inequality indicators, following the estimation strategy of 
Aghion et al. (2015). The effects of both patenting flows variables (as percent of active 
population and per million of inhabitants) present a statistically significant and negative 
effect on the Gini coefficient (see Table 1, columns 1-2 and 3-4, respectively). This 
holds for most fixed-effect and GMM empirical specifications, with the exception of 
column 4, where the results for patenting flows per million of inhabitants and the 
matching GMM estimator are presented.  
Controlling for the size of the government sector in the spatial entities of our sample is 
found to have a positive effect on inequality, which can be attributed to recent evidence 
that government policy explains almost 12% of changes in inequality.10 In addition, the 
physical capital over human capital ratio exhibits a negative and significant association 
with inequality, in line with related literature employing country (Chambers and Krause, 
2010) and regional level data (Benos and Karagiannis, 2018). This result is likely to 
explain the importance of capital accumulation in the form of both investment and 
knowledge, and in turn, its direct impact on inequality. A number of additional control 
variables suggested throughout the literature were also used without altering the 
estimates of the main variables of interest to a large extent. This includes the value 
added ratio between the agricultural and the service sector, population growth and GDP 
per capita. A potential explanation is that the physical/human capital ratio and 
government size already capture the related effects, and hence additional ones do not 
provide any additional information to our estimations.  
                                           
10 See Cozzi and Impullitti (2010). 
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The estimations are repeated with the inclusion of top 1% and top 10% income 
indicators (see Table 2, columns 5-12). According to our estimations, both top income 
indicators present a positive significant association with innovation in most GMM 
estimations, in line with the results offered by Aghion et al. (2015). Also, Lee and 
Rodriguez-Pose (2013) suggest in their study that such (growth) benefits go to selected 
groups of innovators, resulting in greater inequality. In other words, innovation 
intensity increases the income shares at the high end of distribution.   
In Table 2 we repeat the exercise utilising the two ratios - Ratio 90/10 and Ratio 90/50 
- as inequality indicators. Here, the Ratios 90/10 yield consistently significant effects in 
contrast to the Ratios 90/50, pointing at a stronger relationship between the extreme 
moments of the income distribution. 
In all instances, Ratio 90/10 (columns 1-4) yields a negative and statistically significant 
association with innovation, indicating that the gap between top income and the very 
low income is reduced. Only in the GMM specifications, innovation has a negative effect 
on inequality when the Ratio 90/50 is applied, suggesting that high and middle income 
groups come closer to each other due to innovation activities (columns 6 and 8); 
however, the coefficient estimates remain insignificant in the FE specification. Note that 
the autocorrelation (AR(2)) and Hansen test for joint validity of the instruments are 
reported after the GMM estimations. In all cases, the null hypothesis is rejected, thus 
no evidence of autocorrelation and instrument’s overidentification is observed.  
4.2. Estimation with different categories of patents 
Next, we focus on different categories of patents, in an attempt to further analyse the 
income-inequality relation and its drivers. Patents are categorised following the 
canonical classifications (International Patent Classification) and technology areas 
proposed by Eurostat.11 First, high-tech patents enter our models and reveal that such 
innovating activities once more have a negative and significant effect on overall 
inequality, as the sign of the Gini coefficient is negative and statistically significant (at 
the 10% level) (see Table 3, columns 1-4). Note that overall, high-technology patent 
applications accounted for slightly less than one quarter (23.9%) of the applications 
made to the European patent office in 2012, with a declining trend afterwards (Eurostat, 
                                           
11 High-tech  patents  are  counted  following  the  criteria  established  by  the  Trilateral 
Statistical  Report:  Computer  and  automated business  equipment;  micro-organism  and  
genetic  engineering;  aviation;  communications  technology; semiconductors; lasers.   
See: Eurostat indicators on High-tech industry and Knowledge – intensive services;  
Annex 6 – High-tech aggregation by patents  
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an6.pdf) 
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2018)12. For the same year, patent applications for Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) represented almost one third (31.5%) of the total applications made 
to the EPO, biotechnology patents accounted for 4.8%. 
Largely, estimated results remain in line with our previous findings (columns 5-8 for 
Top 1% and columns 9-12 for Top 10%). So, in the same notion as before, we can infer 
that high-tech innovation activity increases the incomes at the high end of distribution. 
Finally, we empirically estimate the effects of innovation on inequality using the ratios 
between high and low income deciles and between high and middle ones (see Table 4). 
Results concur with previous findings as both indicators provide evidence on a negative 
and significant association between innovation and inequality (see columns 1-4 for 
Ratio 90/10 and columns 5-8 for Ratio 90/50; mainly for GMM). Second, patents from 
the more detailed category of micro-organism and genetic engineering that are part of 
the biotechnology sector enter our estimations in Tables 5  
Results remain qualitatively the same, as this type of innovation flows exhibits a 
negative and statistical significance with overall income distribution and a positive one 
with top 10% income shares (see columns 1-4 and columns 5-10 in Table 5, 
respectively); yet, top 1% income share equations do not yield significance. With 
respect to the decile ratios, the Ratio 90/10 equations are significant under GMM only; 
however, the Ratio 90/50 equations are altogether insignificant (see columns 1-4 and 
columns 5-8 in Table 6, respectively). Note that two additional categories of patents 
were also used for the estimation of the innovation-inequality nexus, namely ICT and 
telecommunications, but no apparent association was found.  
Overall, the results offered by the empirical investigation are in line with the limited 
literature, in particular with regards to the overall income distribution (see Lee and 
Rodrıguez-Pose, 2013) and top income shares (see Aghion et al., 2015). 
4.3. Sensitivity of results  
As a basic check to the sensitivity of the results, Table 7 and Table 8 repeats the 
evidence of the baseline estimations (Table 1) with the use of NUTS 2 regions only and 
time effects in our econometric specifications. Please note that in total 43 regions are 
employed coming from four Member States (Czech Republic, Spain, Finland and France) 
which are diverse both, in terms of innovation activity and in inequality levels. The 
results support the general findings presented earlier. Once again, the effects of 
innovation flows on overall inequality have a negative and statistically significant effect 
                                           
12 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Archive:Patent_statistics 
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on the Gini coefficient (see columns 1-4 in Table 7). The top 10% income group appears 
in most cases to benefit from such innovative processes proxied by patenting (see 
columns 5-12). Also, the negative and significant association with the two decile ratios 
is confirmed. Overall, our estimations are not sensitive to a sample restricted to NUTS 
2 units and with the inclusion of time effects.  
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5. Conclusions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report offers a systematic empirical analysis of the effect that innovation has on 
inequality in the EU and the EMU. It provides better evidence on this relationship by 
introducing a spatial disaggregation of the member-states, that is taking into account 
regional differences and a longer time of observation. Also, possible effects are 
investigated for different types of inequality, namely overall distribution, high income 
shares and the ratio between different income groups.  
The estimated results offer a rather revealing depiction on the innovation-income 
inequality nexus. Our empirics portray that innovation have significant and diverse 
effects in different income inequality indicators, as it reduces overall distribution and 
the gap between high incomes and lower and middle income groups, while enhancing 
at the same time high incomes. These findings support a number of relevant economic 
theories which argue that innovation has an income inequality reducing effect, 
including. Also, our findings confirm a number of recent empirical studies in the 
literature, where the effect of innovativeness on top income inequality is found to be 
negative for wage inequality (Lee and Rodriguez-Pose, 2013) and for top income shares 
(see Aghion et al, 2015). 
There is a wide spread belief in society that technological process together with 
innovation is detrimental to the weak members of the society, for instance, as it 
occurred in the First Industrial Revolution. However, our findings further confirm that 
this is not the case, and corroborate the set of falsifying evidence. As a take home 
message, we can emphasise that technological process and high tech investment, in 
the form of innovative actions, does not hamper the overall distribution in an economy. 
Nevertheless, we need to be aware that movements at the high-end of the distribution 
can occur.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Definitions, Descriptive statistics and County Groups  
 
Table 1A: Definitions and Sources of Original Data 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Gini 
Average distance between all pairs of 
proportional income in the population 
EU-SILC; British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS); German 
Socioeconomic (GSOEP) Panel 
Survey 
High income share 
Top 10%, and Top 1% income shares (in 
percent of total income of a NUTS region) 
EU-SILC; British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS); German 
Socioeconomic (GSOEP) Panel 
Survey 
Ratio 90/10  
Ratio 90/50 
The ratio of income of the 90th and the 10th 
percentile; 
The ratio of income of the 90th decile and 
median income; 
EU-SILC; British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS); German 
Socioeconomic (GSOEP) Panel 
Survey 
Patents (act) 
Patent applications to the EPO; 
Per million of active population  
Eurostat 
Patents (mil) 
Patent applications to the EPO; 
Per million inhabitants 
Eurostat 
High-tech patents 
The number of patents per million for high-
technology sectors only.  
These are: Computer and Automated 
Business Equipment; Communication 
Technology; Laser; Micro-organism and 
genetic engineering; semi-conductors. 
Eurostat 
Micro-organism & 
genetic engineering 
patents 
The number of patents per million in the 
sector.  
Eurostat 
Capital/Education 
The ratio between physical capital 
(investment based; 2005=100) and % of 
labour force with tertiary education (in logs) 
Eurostat 
Government size 
The value added of the public sector as a % 
of the GDP 
Eurostat 
Pop density 
Population divided by the land area in km2 Eurostat 
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Table 2A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 1,295 0.29 0.04 0.21 0.55 
Top 1% 1,295 3,154.76 1,906.10 230.13 10,538.50 
Top 10% 1,295 7,371.13 3,335.01 663.44 18,738.00 
Ratio 90/10 1,295 3.72 0.83 2.42 12.48 
Ratio 90/50 1,295 1.90 0.18 1.50 3.05 
Patents (act) 1,295 434.07 945.09 0.20 6,333.62 
Patents (mil) 1,295 84.73 97.24 0.31 589.96 
HT patents 1,007 16.80 22.60 0.04 168.11 
MGE patents 1,007 3.22 3.39 0.04 25.70 
Capital/education 1,270 0.0793 0.0239 0.0203 0.156 
 
Table 3A: Country Codes & Data Availability 
 
Countries Code NUTS 0 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 
Austria AT  3  
Belgium BE  3  
Cyprus CY 1   
Czech Republic  CZ   8 
Denmark DK 1   
Germany DE  16  
Estonia EE 1   
Greece EL  4  
Spain ES   19 
Finland FI   4 
France  FR   22 
Croatia HR 1   
Hungary HU  3  
Ireland IE 1   
Italy IT  5  
Lithuania LT 1   
Luxembourg LU 1   
Malta MT 1   
Netherlands NL 1   
Poland PL  6  
Portugal PT 1   
Sweden SE  3  
Romania RO  4  
Slovakia SK 1   
Slovenia SI 1   
United Kingdom UK  12  
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Figure 1A: Gini index, 2004-2014 Figure 2A: Top 10%, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; EU-SILC for income calculations  Source: Authors’ calculations; EU-SILC for income calculations  
 
.
2
.
2
5
.
3
.
3
5
.
4
G
i
n
i
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
excludes outside values
0
.
0
5
.
1
.
1
5
.
2
.
2
5
T
o
p
 
1
0
%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
excludes outside values
 30 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Literature review of empirical studies 
TABLE 1B: MAIN INGREDIENTS OF RELATED EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Study Territorial 
Level 
Period Data 
Source 
Econometric Method Results 
Donegan, M., & Lowe, N. 
(2008). Inequality in the 
Creative City: Is There 
Still a Place for “Old-
Fashioned” Institutions? 
Economic Development 
Quarterly, 22(1), 46–62. 
US cities 2004 Florida 2002, 
p.282 
OLS cross-sectional specification 
Dependent variable: wage inequality in 2004 
Independent variable:  
- Composite measure of local high-
tech industrial output 
- Innovation is positively associated 
with higher levels of inequality 
- Wage inequality is higher in creative 
cities 
Lee, N. (2011). Are 
Innovative Regions More 
Unequal? Evidence from 
Europe. Environment and 
Planning C: Government 
and Policy, 29(1), 2–23. 
European 
Regions (89, 
NUTS-1 level) 
1995-2001 ECHP and 
Eurostat 
Regio 
database 
 
Fixed Effects Panel Regression Models 
Dependent variable: wage inequality 
- Gini 
- Theil 
- Atkinson 
- P8020 
Independent variable: innovation 
- Patents per 100,000 inhabitants 
(High-Tech, ICT and Biotech 
Patents) 
Employment in knowledge-based industries 
- Positive relationship between 
innovation as measured by patenting 
and inequality according to different 
inequality measures 
- Little link between the proportion of 
employment in knowledge-based 
industries and inequality 
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Lee, N., & Rodríguez-Pose, 
A. (2013). Innovation and 
spatial inequality in 
Europe and USA. Journal 
of Economic Geography, 
13(1), 1–22. 
EU Regions 
(93, NUTS-1 
level) and US 
cities (70) 
1995-2001 
1996-2009 
ECHP  
CPS for US 
Panel data regression with fixed effects 
Dependent variable: wage inequality 
- Gini coefficient of wages 
Independent variable: innovation 
- Patents filed per million 
inhabitants 
(High-Tech, ICT and Biotech 
Patents) 
 
- It appears that patenting is a 
significant driver of inequality in 
European Regions, but there is no 
general effect in USA; the effect for US 
cities is limited to sub-sectors  
Breau, S., Kogler, D. F., & 
Bolton, K. C. (2014). On 
the Relationship between 
Innovation and Wage 
Inequality: New Evidence 
from Canadian Cities. 
Economic Geography, 
90(4), 351–373. 
Canadian 
cities (85 
cities) 
1996-2006 Census of 
Canada 
Panel data regression with fixed effects 
Dependent variable: wage inequality 
- Gini coefficient  
- Theil index 
Independent variable: innovation 
- Patents per million residents 
- More innovative cities are more 
unequal in terms of their distribution 
of earnings 
- The result holds using different 
measures of inequality and 
innovation, as well as after 
controlling for a series of variables 
- The finding is also robust to the 
estimation of alternative 
instrumental variables specifications 
Liu, Q., Lin Lawell, C-Y C. 
(2015). The effects of 
innovation on income 
inequality in China. 
 
NUTS-2 level 
(31 provinces) 
and NUTS-1 
level (3 
regions) 
1995-2011 China 
Statistical 
Yearbook 
IV regression with province fixed effects and 
year effects.  
Dependent variable:  
- Ratio between urban and rural 
income 
Independent variable: innovation  
- number of patents approved per 
10,000 inhabitants 
- number of patents approved per 
10,000 inhabitants squared 
- Innovation can decrease income 
inequality 
- The relationship between the 
innovation level and income 
inequality is not linear but U-shaped 
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Aghion, P., Akcigit, U., 
Bergeaud, A., Blundell, R., 
& Hémous, D. (2015). 
Innovation and Top 
Income Inequality 
(Working Paper No. 
21247). National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
US state-level 
(51) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1975-2010  US State-
Level Income 
Inequality 
Database  
OLS and IV Regression. 
Dependent variable: inequality 
- Top1 income share 
- Top10 income share 
- Gini 
- Gini99 
- Theil 
- Atkinson 
Independent variable: innovation 
- Patent per thousand people. 
- 3 (resp 4 and 5) YWindow: 
citation received no longer than 3 
(resp 4 and 5) years after. 
- Share5: Total number of patent 
among the 5% most cited in a 
given application  
- Citations: Total number of 
citations made to patents  
- Renew: Number of patents that 
have been renewed at least once  
- Positive and significant correlation 
between various measures of 
innovativeness and top income 
inequality in the United States 
- Innovation does not appear to 
increase other measures of inequality 
which do not focus on top incomes 
- The positive effects of innovation on 
the top 1% income share are 
dampened in states with higher 
lobbying intensity 
Antonelli, C., & Gehringer, 
A. (2017). Technological 
change, rent and income 
inequalities: A 
Schumpeterian approach. 
Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 115, 
85–98. 
39 
industrialized 
countries 
1995-2011 Eurostat and  
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
database 
Quintile Regression 
Dependent variable: inequality 
- Gini coefficient 
- Q5/Q1 ratio between the fifth and 
the first quintile 
Independent variable: innovation 
- Number of patent applications 
made each year 
- The rate of technological change 
reduces income asymmetries: when 
technological change is high it can 
reduce income inequality via a 
reduction of rents 
- The inequality reducing effects of the 
rate of technological change start to 
operate at a certain level of income 
inequality 
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Castells-Quintana, D., 
Ramos, R., & Royuela, V. 
(2015). Income inequality 
in European Regions: 
Recent trends and 
determinants. Review of 
Regional Research, 35(2), 
123–146. 
EU Regions 
(NUTS-1 level)  
1996-2011 ECHP 
EU-SILC 
Cross-sections and panel  
Dependent variable: within-region income 
inequality 
- Gini 
-P9010, P5010, P9050 
Independent variables: GDP, GDP2 and a vector 
of control variables, including a measure of 
technological change (person with tertiary 
education and/or employed in science and 
technology) 
- Results show that the evolution of 
inequality is significantly more 
heterogonous in Europe when 
regions, rather than countries, are 
considered 
- Regarding the determinants, results 
suggest that tertiary specialization 
and technological change, are 
associated with increasing 
inequalities 
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Appendix C: Regression results 
TABLE 1C: BASIC ESTIMATIONS WITH PHYSCIAL & HUMAN CAPITAL RATIO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GINI GINI GINI GINI Top 1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top10% Top10% Top10% Top10% 
 FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
L. Patents (act) -0.0105* -0.0177** - - 0.00218 0.0371 - - 0.0171 7.711*** - - 
 (-1.85) (-2.55)   (0.19) (1.03)   (1.46) (133.83)   
             
Patents (act) - -0.00611 - -  0.0788* - - - -0.0248** - - 
  (-0.98)    (1.96)    (-2.49)   
             
Capital/Education -205.4 -1605.3*** -196.0 -1.101*** -6269.0*** -5580.8* -6290.9*** -8898.1*** -9334.0*** -2029.7*** -12017.2*** -2034.7*** 
 (-0.53) (-3.46) (-0.51) (-29.78) (-2.99) (-1.86) (-3.01) (-3.25) (-11.65) (-2.67) (-3.01) (-2.67) 
             
Government Size  1.181*** 3.779*** 1.191*** 3.752*** 7.157*** 2.442*** 7.172*** 3.779*** 7.969*** 7.709*** 8.761*** 8.761*** 
 (28.36) (35.90) (30.78) (42.87) (31.80) (48.19) (34.31) (35.90) (92.52) (69.69) (193.38) (193.38) 
             
L. Patents (mil) - - -0.0100* 0.00192 - - 0.0524* 0.160*** - - 0.00357 0.615*** 
   (-1.77) (0.24)   (1.72) (3.91)   (0.29) (30.89) 
             
Patents (mil) - - - -0.00722 - - - 0.114*** - - - -0.0230** 
    (-1.03)    (3.09)    (-2.30) 
L. Gini - 0.054 
(0.035) 
- 0.046 
(0.308) 
- - - - - - - - 
             
L. Top 1% - - - - - -0.379*** - -0.265*** - - - - 
      (-9.94)  (-7.46)     
             
L.Top10% - - - - - - - -  0.626*** - 0.625*** 
         - (27.27)  (27.12) 
             
Constant -1.181*** - -1.191*** - 7.157*** - 7.172*** - 7.969*** - 8.761*** - 
 (-28.36)  (-30.78)  (31.80)  (34.31)  (92.52)  (193.38)  
N 993 736 993 603 993 603 993 736 993 736 996 736 
AR (2) (Hansen)  - 0.38 (0.81) - 0.63(0.71) - 0.84(0.81) - 0.62(1.00) - 0.83(0.28) - 0.71(0.08) 
Notes: Dependent variable patent applications (per mil. of inhabitants and alternatively per mil. of active population) in spatial entity i (i=1...128) in period t (t=2004…2014). Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, 
*** denote 10%, 5% & 1% significance levels respectively. FE: fixed effect; AB–BB: Arellano and Bover (1995)–Blundell and Bond (1998). AR(2) test: Arellano and Bond test for 2nd order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced errors with H0 of no serial correlation, z-statistics are provided with p-values in parentheses. Hansen test of overidentifying moment conditions with H0 of valid overidentifying conditions with 
p-values is provided in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2C: BASIC ESTIMATIONS WITH PHYSCIAL & HUMAN CAPITAL RATIO & INEQUALITY RATIOS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9050 Ratio9050 Ratio9050 Ratio9050 
 FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
L. Patents (act) -0.0125* -0.107** - - -0.00184 -0. 176** - - 
 (-1.75) (-1.55)   (-0.16) (-1.58)   
         
Patents (act) - -0.0164 - - - 0.000465 - - 
  (-0.64)    (0.04)   
         
Capital/Education -3987.2** -9586.8*** -3952.8** -9521.6*** -1987.2** -4090.9*** -1984.2** -4034.5*** 
 (-2.40) (-5.07) (-2.38) (-5.03) (-2.49) (-4.36) (-2.49) (-4.30) 
         
Government Size 4.127*** 7.704*** 4.090*** 7.709*** 2.616*** 8.782*** 2.614*** 8.761*** 
 (23.15) (57.88) (24.68) (69.69) (30.46) (161.15) (32.75) (193.38) 
         
L. Patents (mil) - - -0.0205* -0.0177** - - -0.00162 -0.0122** 
   (-1.96) (-2.55)   (-0.14) (-2.02) 
         
Patents (mil) - - - -0.0186 - - - -0.020 
    (-0.72)    (-0.033) 
         
L. Ratio 9010 - -0.0483 - -0.0237 - - - - 
  (-1.53)  (0.031)     
         
L. Ratio 9050 - - - - - -0.0273 - -0.0293 
      (-0.82)  (-0.88) 
         
Constant 4.127*** - 4.090*** - 2.616*** - 2.614*** - 
 (23.15)  (24.68)  (30.46)  (32.75)  
N 993 736 993 736 993 736 993 736 
AR (2) (Hansen)  - 0.71(0.68) - 0.84(0.81) - 0.62(0.89) - 0.83(0.28) 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
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TABLE 3C: ESTIMATIONS WITH HIGH-TECH PATENTS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GINI GINI GINI GINI Top 1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top10% Top10% Top10% Top10% 
FE GMM FE GMM FE |GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
L.High tech patents (act) -0.00412 -0.00839* - - 0.0101 0.0615** - - 0.0293*** 0.0254*** - - 
(-1.00) (-1.72) (0.46) (2.18) (3.42) (3.40) 
High tech patents - -0.0276*** - - - 0.136*** - - - 0.0179* - - 
(-4.39) (3.79) (1.92) 
Capital/Education 205.4 1605.3*** -196.0 -1.101*** 6269.0*** 5580.8* 6290.9*** 8898.1*** 9334.0*** 2029.7*** 12017.2*** 2034.7*** 
(0.53) (3.46) (-0.51) (-29.78) (2.99) (1.86) (3.01) (3.25) (11.65) (2.67) (3.01) (2.67) 
Government Size 1.236*** 0.278*** 1.239*** 0.0288*** 7.920*** 0.608*** 7.908*** 0.148*** 8.733*** 0.610*** 8.751*** 0.0215** 
(113.37) (7.55) (157.39) (4.60) (135.56) (28.36) (187.38) (4.13) (383.75) (28.60) (532.93) (2.30) 
L.High tech patents (mil) - - -0.003 -0.008* - - 0.007 0.069** - - 0.0313*** 0.027*** 
(-0.94) (-1.72) (0.35) (2.48) (3.67) (3.71) 
High tech patents (mil) - - - -0.0288*** - - 0.148*** - - - 0.0215** 
(-4.60) (4.13) (2.30) 
L. Gini - -0.103 
(-0.035) 
- -0.107 
(-0.035) 
- - - - - - - - 
L. Top 1% - - - - - -0.273*** - -0.277*** - - - - 
(-0.036) (-0.036) 
L.Top10% - - - - - - - - -0.609*** - -0.608*** 
- (-0.021) (-0.021) 
Constant -1.236*** - -1.239*** - 7.920*** -- 7.908*** - 8.733*** - 8.751*** - 
(-113.37) (-157.39) (135.56) (187.38) (383.75) (532.93) 
N 946 665 946 665 946 665 946 665 946 665 946 665 
AR (2) (Hansen)  0.58 (0.64) 0.62(0.72) 0.84(0.84) 0.62(0.58) 0.79(0.28) 0.72(0.87) 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
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TABLE 4C: ESTIMATIONS WITH HIGH-TECH PATENTS & INEQUALITY RATIOS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9030 Ratio9030 Ratio9030 Ratio9030 
 FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
L. High tech patents (act) -0.006 -0.248*** - - -0.004 -0.004 - - 
 (-0.39) (-6.52)   (-0.49) (-0.44)   
         
High tech patents (act) - -0.0834*** - - - -0.0266** - - 
  (-3.53)    (-2.18)   
         
Capital/Education 1096.8** 2207.5*** 2187.8*** 21848.6*** 10159.6*** 4157.6*** 8360.9*** 1096.8** 
 (2.37) (26.19) (16.97) (8.66) (4.22) (16.61) (11.08) (-.37) 
         
Government size 3.634*** 0.0834*** 3.626*** 0.166*** 2.452*** 0.0266** 2.449*** 0.167*** 
 (83.43) (3.53) (115.25) (4.44) (111.74) (2.18) (154.47) (4.44) 
         
L. High tech patents (mil) - - -0.004 -0.278*** - - -0.003 -0.025*** 
   (-0.29) (-8.05)   (-0.46) (-3.40) 
         
High tech patents (mil) - - - -0.0846*** - - - -0.0272** 
    (-3.59)    (-2.24) 
         
L. Ratio 9010 - -0.166*** - -0.166*** - - - - 
  (-0.037)  (0.037)     
         
L. Ratio 9050 - - - - - -0.140*** - -0.141*** 
      (-0.035)  (-0.036) 
         
Constant 3.634*** - 3.626*** - 2.452*** - 2.449*** - 
 (83.43)  (115.25)  (111.74)  (154.47)  
N 946 665 946 665 946 665 946 665 
AR (2) (Hansen)  0.64(0.87)  0.72(0.74)  0.71(0.78)  0.81(0.78) 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
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 TABLE 5C: ESTIMATIONS WITH MICRO-ORGAMISM & GENETIC ENGEERING PATENTS  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GINI GINI GINI GINI Top 1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top10% Top10% Top10% Top10% 
 FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
L.MGE patents (act) -0.001 -0.312*** - - -0.0266 -0.0357 - - -0.00816 -0.00909 - - 
 (-0.51) (-8.13)   (-1.40) (-1.52)   (-1.14) (-1.48)   
             
MGE patents (act) - 0.00722 - -0.00186 - -0.0441 - - - -0.0201*** - - 
  (1.39)  (-0.50)  (-1.54)    (-2.67)   
             
Capital/Education  -6269.0*** -5580.8* -6290.9*** -8898.1*** -9334.0*** -2029.7*** -12017.2*** -2034.7*** -3.779*** -1.191*** -3.752*** 7-.157*** 
 (-2.99) (-1.86) (-3.01) (-3.25) (-11.65) (-2.67) (-3.01) (-2.67) (-35.90) (-30.78) (-42.87) (-31.80) 
             
Government size 0.105*** 0.195*** 0.182*** 0.189*** 0.0434*** 0.0437*** 5.478*** 2.522*** 3.588*** 1.339*** 3.779*** 7.969*** 
 (2.91) (5.52) (42.40) (25.75) (6.71) (3.30) (34.53) (12.63) (99.64) (28.50) (35.90) (92.52) 
             
L.MGE patents (act) - - -0.0272** -0.342*** - - -0.0254 -0.0302 - - 0.00655 0.0186** 
   (-2.24) (-8.36)   (-1.33) (-1.29)   (-0.91) (-2.48) 
             
MGE patents (act) - - - 0.00566 - - - -0.0355 - - - -0.00805 
    (1.08)    (-1.24)    (-1.33) 
             
L. Gini - -0.003 
(-0.039) 
- -0.005 
(-0.039) 
- - - - - - - - 
             
L. Top 1% - - - - - -0.342*** - -0.341*** - - - - 
      (-0.040)  (-0.040)     
             
L.Top10% - - - - - - - -  -0.584*** - -0.583*** 
         - (-0.028)  (-0.029) 
             
Constant -1.245*** - -1.247*** - 8.006*** - 7.986*** - 8.903*** - 8.896*** - 
 (-236.87)  (-429.60)  (298.93)  (540.06)  (882.82)  (1597.48)  
N 828 538 828 538 828 538 828 538 828 538 828 538 
AR (2) (Hansen)   0.47(0.79)  0.65(0.85)  0.82(0.81)  0.62(.95)  0.83(0.53)  0.72(0.09) 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
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TABLE 6C: ESTIMATIONS WITH MICRO-ORGAMISM & GENETIC ENGEERING PATENTS & INEQUALITY RATIOS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9050 Ratio9050 Ratio9050 Ratio9050 
FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
L.MGE patents (act) 0.0140 -0.165*** - - 0.00647 0.0117 - - 
(0.99) (-3.86) (0.88) (1.41) 
MGE patents (act) - -0.0158 - - - 0.00229 - - 
(-0.80) (0.23) 
Capital/Education -0.0244 -0.158*** -0.023 -1.112*** -196.0 -1.181*** -1.442*** -0.144*** 
(-1.77) (-3.71) (-1.63) (-27.88) (-0.51) (-31.88) (-48.19) (-3.19) 
Government size 0.114 0.088*** 0.080 0.092*** 0.270*** 0.135*** 0.0234 0.273*** 
(1.45) (1.71) (0.91) (1.70) (2.48) (3.42) (1.47) (2.51) 
L.MGE patents (mil) - - 0.0144 -0.149*** - - 0.00637 0.0108 
(1.01) (-3.61) (0.86) (1.31) 
MGE patents (mil) - - - -0.0217 - - - 0.000774 
(-1.09) (0.08) 
L. Ratio 9010 - -0.158*** - -0.164*** - - - - 
(-0.041) (0.041) 
L. Ratio 9050 - - - - - -0.142*** - -0.149*** 
(-0.041) (-0.042) 
Constant 3.568*** - 3.578*** - 2.421*** - 2.426*** - 
(178.48) (324.25) (233.12) (423.14) 
N 828 538 828 538 828 538 828 538 
AR (2) (Hansen)  0.39 (0.71) 0.62(0.52) 0.74(0.81) 0.62(1.00) 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
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TABLE 7C: ROBUSTNESS ESTIMATIONS WITH TIME EFFECTS & NUTS 2 ONLY 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GINI GINI GINI GINI Top 1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top10% Top10% Top10% Top10% 
FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
L.Patents (act) -0.00323 -0.241*** - - 0.0648 0.0419 - - 0.0300*** -0.0527*** - - 
(-0.35) (-5.01) (1.28) (0.59) (3.37) (-3.77) 
Patents (act) - -0.0000800 - - - 0.0669 - - - -0.00431 - - 
(-0.01) (1.15) (-0.34) 
Capital/Education -1146.6* -1319.9* -1149.4* -555.0 4750.0 3929.8 4779.2 13096.6*** 4890.6*** 2964.1*** -1712.3* 2917.0*** 
(-1.81) (-1.88) (-1.81) (-0.68) (1.37) (0.94) (1.38) (3.37) (7.74) (3.43) (-1.88) (3.37) 
Government size 0.207*** 0.233** 0.233*** 0.294*** 0.263 2.063*** 0.260 2.760*** 1.007*** 1.278*** 1.251*** 1.287*** 
(5.57) (2.53) (5.01) (2.86) (1.29) (3.75) (1.28) (5.24) (25.36) (10.69) (25.81) (10.79) 
L.Patents (mil) - - -1.251*** -0.218*** - - 0.0701 0.0385 - - -0.00807 -0.0495*** 
(-25.81) (-5.04) (1.39) (0.61) (-0.62) (-3.53) 
- - 
Patents (mil) - - - 0.00651 - - 0.116** - -0.00516 
(0.59) (2.05) (-0.41) 
L.Gini - 0.034 
(0.62) 
- 0.066 
(1.19) 
- - - - - - - - 
L.Top 1% - - - - - -0.275*** - -0.232*** - - - - 
(-4.87) (-4.38) 
L.Top 10% - - - - - - - - - 0.268*** - 0.261*** 
(5.54) (5.40) 
Constant -0.865*** - -0.860*** - 7.772*** - 7.795*** - 9.879*** - 10.91*** - 
(-8.97) (-9.12) (14.72) (15.09) (99.08) (129.96) 
N 439 337 439 286 439 286 439 337 975 337 439 337 
AR (2) (Hansen) - 0.38 (0.81) - 0.63(0.71) - 0.84(0.81) - 0.62(1.00) - 0.83(0.28) - 0.71(0.08) 
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TABLE 8C: ROBUSTNESS ESTIMATIONS WITH TIME EFFECTS, NUTS 2 ONLY & INEQUALITY RATIOS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9010 Ratio9050 Ratio9050 Ratio9050 Ratio9050 
FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
L.Patents (act) -0.0793* -0.174*** - - -0.0397** 0.0252 - - 
(-1.90) (-4.02) (-2.17) (1.20) 
Patents (act) - 0.141*** - - 0.0682*** - - 
(3.67) (3.67) 
Capital/Education -6505.9** -7116.9*** -6523.6** -7060.2** -3107.8** -2685.9** -3121.1** -2739.5** 
(-2.28) (-2.61) (-2.28) (-2.58) (-2.48) (-2.07) (-2.49) (-2.09) 
Government size 0.581*** 0.703** 0.572*** 0.679** 0.194*** -0.0207 0.189** -0.0237 
(3.47) (2.05) (3.42) (1.98) (2.64) (-0.13) (2.57) (-0.14) 
L.Patents (mil) - - -0.0722* -0.160*** - - -0.0175 -0.0350* 
(-1.73) (-3.68) (-0.82) (-1.92) 
Patents (mil) - - - 0.134*** - - - 0.0627*** 
(3.48) (3.35) 
L.Ratio9010 - -0.0291 - -0.0349 - - - - 
(-0.63) (-0.76) 
L.Ratio9030 - - - - - -0.0429 - -0.0430 
(-0.89) (-0.89) 
Constant 4.587*** - 4.660*** - 2.761*** - 2.801*** - 
(10.55) (10.94) (14.48) (14.99) 
N 439 337 439 337 439 337 439 337 
AR (2) (Hansen) 0.69 (0.58) 0.72(0.62) 0.84(0.71) 0.62(0.95) 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
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